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Massification and its Critique in the
Nineteenth Century History of
Ideas: József Eötvös on Popular




1 Overviews of the concept of mass culture place the emergence of the term and the
phenomena  it  denotes  between  the  1920’s  and  the  1930’s.  This  is  the  period,  the
argument  goes,  of  the  rise  of  mass  culture  produced  and  marketed  by  industrial
techniques, for masses that are no longer held together by traditional values, that no
longer  form  small  communities1 (Strinati  2004:  5.)  Ever  since,  one  of  the  central
questions guiding the study of mass culture has been its relationship to political power
and public life:
Is  popular  culture  there  to  indoctrinate  the  people,  to  get  them to  accept  and
adhere to ideas and values which ensure the continued dominance of those in more
privileged positions who thus exercise power over them? Or is it about rebellion
and  opposition  to  the  prevailing  social  order?  Does  it  express,  in  however  an
imperceptible, subtle and rudimentary manner, resistance to those in power, and
the subversion of dominant ways of thinking and acting?2
2 This paper investigates the way the relationship between popular culture and public
life was addressed before the rise of mass culture in 20th century by József Eötvös, one
of the most prominent Central European political thinkers of the time - from a vantage
point  from  which  several  later  developments  could  already  be  foreseen.  His  most
important work of political theory, The Dominant Ideas of the Nineteenth Century and Their
Impact on the State,3 offered a criticism of the modern phenomena of massification and
industrialisation of  culture,  and  the  accompanying  phenomena  of  homogenisation,
from the point of view of their consequences on the organisation of the state and on
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public life. Apart from offering his critique, Eötvös also argued for the importance of
understanding the meanings and uses of popular ideas. 
3  The case of Eötvös and of The Dominant Ideas points to several wider phenomena in the
history of mass culture and of thinking about mass culture. It shows how the political
language of aristocratic liberalism, that of Tocqueville, Mill, Burckhardt or Eötvös was
one of the first attempts at articulating such a critique in a manner that surpassed the
traditional “elite” criticism of the “vulgus” by pointing to the wider mechanisms at
work  in  the  new  spatial  realities  of  the  modern  city:  the  cultural  realities  of
commodification and homogenization, and the political realities of the manufacturing
of  popular  opinion  in  the  popular  press,  through  opinion  polls  and  petitions.  The
importance of  Eötvös’  work further lies  in his  going beyond the aristocratic  liberal
critique and its educational project, and pointing to the need to understand the new
meaning-making practices in order to be able to articulate the meanings and stakes
attached to the newly popular ideas.
 
Eötvös and The Dominant Ideas
4 Today,  Eötvös  is  known  primarily  as  a  novelist,  author  of  novels  addressing  the
pressing social and political issues of his times: revolutionary transformations, social
relations,  power  and corruption,  feudalism and modernity.  As  a  politician,  he  held
office in the revolutionary government of 1848,  serving as minister of Religion and
Education, a position to which he returned in 1867, passing the Elementary Education
Act.  In  The  Dominant  Ideas he  looked  for  the  causes  of  the  failure  of  the  reform
movement by looking at the meanings attributed to the dominant ideas of the times:
liberty, equality and nationality. Issues of nationality stood at the centre of his interests
both  as  a  politician  and  a  political  thinker,  and  The  Dominant  Ideas,  as  well  as  his
writings  on  nationality  rights,  are  today  mostly  read  by  students  of  national
movements  and  minority  issues.  The  most  recent  collective  volume  on  his  work,
celebrating the  two hundredth anniversary  of  his  birth,  focused on his  intellectual
biography, his fiction writing, his opinions on the national question, his career as a
politician, his educational policies, and the “Eötvös tradition” in the education system.4
5 The Dominant Ideas was written after the failure of the 1848 Hungarian revolution, and
grappled with the sources of this failure and the conditions required for the success of
social and political reforms. The sweeping changes of 1848 throughout Europe, Eötvös
wrote, were possible because many different people shared the dominant ideas of the
time:  liberty,  equality  and  national  independence.  The  movements  that  tried  to
implement these ideas,  however,  failed.  Thus,  either the ideas were wrong,  or they
were misunderstood by those meant to put them into practice. 
6 Eötvös’s reflections on the popular meanings and the commodification of culture and
the media are formulated in the context of his wider argument on the nature of the
dominant ideas and the attempts made to realize them. The key problem of the work,
as the title suggested, was the relationship between the ideas of liberty, equality and
national identity, and the state. Starting from the premise that “the only natural state
for  mankind is  in  society” and that  “the dissolution of  every State  existing now is
unthinkable  without  the  destruction  of  our  civilization,”5 Eötvös  then  showed how
these dominant ideas contradicted each other in the interpretation given to them by
the elites, and that if realized in their current interpretation, they were to lead to the
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disintegration  of  the  existing  states.  He  then  argued  that  the  meaning  people,  in
general, attached to the dominant ideas of the 19th century was not the same as the one
given  to  them  by  those  who  have  tried  to  realize  them.  Moreover,  the  meaning
generally  attached to  the dominant  ideas  by the common people,  not  only  did not
contradict the state, but in fact presupposed the formation of larger ones. The main
misunderstanding revolved around the idea of liberty, which was redefined as equality,
i.e. equal participation, direct or indirect, in political power for all people. As this kind
of equality could only be realised by limiting individual liberty, in order to counteract
the differences in individual means and abilities, liberty and equality became mutually
exclusive.  Equal  political  participation gave rise to the idea of  popular sovereignty,
which then gave states unlimited powers, again threatening individual liberty and even
leading to despotism. National identity ended up also being used a pretext for a strife
for power and domination, becoming therefore opposed to both liberty and equality.
7 Conclusions to the first volume quoted Tocqueville’s Democracy in America to underpin
the claim that the pursuit of order and equality in the state, with the state regulating
every aspect of life, stalled progress and was a form of tyranny or despotism, even if
based  on  popular  sovereignty;  this  was  the  form  of  oppression  threatening
democracies. Current societies had developed based on the fundamental idea of liberty.
The pursuit of the dominant ideas of equality and national self-determination in their
current conception,  as equal dominion or domination over other nationalities,  with
liberty  defined  as  the  rule  of  majorities  over  others,  would  either  lead  to  the
destruction of the extant states and societies, or to the creation of absolute state power.
Either the state, or society will have to give. The question was: how is it possible to
uphold the dominant ideas and still be able to maintain large states?
8 The second volume posited that, in fact, the meaning people attached to these ideas
was  quite  different.  Historically,  as  well  as  at  the  time,  people  defined  liberty  as
freedom  from  domination.  Even  the  continuous  growth  of  state  power,  evident  in
history,  was  possible  because,  for  long,  people  had  only  been  pursuing  individual
autonomy. They only started seeking participation in power when the state started
encroaching on such individual autonomies. The main goal of the age continued to be
liberty, and the fight for equality was only important to people as a means to achieve
this  liberty.  The  reaction  to  1848  was  only  possible  because  people  lost  their
enthusiasm for the results of the revolution, because measures like universal suffrage,
unlimited power of elected legislatures, juries, the free press or the unlimited right of
assembly, did not correspond to what they sought in the name of liberty. People rather
understood liberty as the state in which one could fully make use of one’s abilities,
equality  as  a  means  to  achieve  freedom,  and  national  self-determination  as  the
application of the idea of liberty to whole nations. Based on this understanding of the
dominant ideas, volume two put forward a strong criticism of state centralisation, a
criticism in fact of what Eötvös himself, later on, were to argue for as a minister:6 a
constitutional  monarchy  with  strong,  autonomous  local  governments  seen  as
guarantees of the fundamental value of liberty.
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The political consequences of massification: the
aristocratic liberal critique
9 Eötvös’s  book is  an unlikely source for  ideas on popular culture.  The author was a
political thinker primarily speaking the language of European aristocratic liberalism,
what Alan Kahan describes as a particular historical perspective and analysis of society
and politics, centred around the values of liberty, individuality and diversity - values
they saw threatened by the centralised, potentially despotic state, the predominance of
commercial  spirit  and  of  material  interests.7 Yet  the  interest  of  these  thinkers  in
preserving  individual  freedom  and  diversity  made  them  especially  sensitive  to  the
consequences  of  the  processes  of  massification,  commodification and marketization
that are today seen as central to the concept of mass culture, as well as to the political
consequences of these processes, to the traditionally uneasy relationship between mass
meaning-making and public life.
10 Kahan’s book discussed Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill and Jakob Burckhardt as
the  main  advocates  of  this  distinctive  discourse.  Although  coming  from  different
national traditions, and with divergent views on many issues, such as the notion of
historical progress, the meaning of equality or the role of the state in society, they all
saw  the  Enlightenment  and  the  French  Revolution  as  the  beginning  of  modernity,
bringing about the birth of the commercial spirit, a taste for uniformity, middle class
domination,  clashes  between  the  middle  and  lower  classes,  and  “the  steady
encroachment  of  the  state  on  the  domains  of  all  other  social  powers  and  on  the
freedom of the individual.”8 The French Revolution played a pivotal role in the process
because, after a first stage of fighting for liberty, it turned into a strife for equality,
which became a threat to liberty, entailing the love of uniformity, unlimited popular
sovereignty, and announcing the the despotism of the majority.
11 In  terms  of  cultural  consequences,  they  saw  these  developments  as  leading  to
mediocrity: mass taste and purchasing power was to be satisfied by speedy production
and cheap, uniform products. This has led to the disappearance of the old, elite and
exclusive reading public that made it possible for authors to allocate the necessary time
and energy to produce out-of-the ordinary work.9
12 In terms of  political  consequences,  centralisation and uniformisation brought about
isolation,  the  breakdown  of  traditional  ties  and  the  destruction  of  local  self-
government,  itself  a  form  of  political  participation  and  liberty.  Centralisation  and
increased homogeneity also brought about the rise of the importance, but also of the
homogeneity of public opinion:
Through the press and through peer pressure, public opinion controlled individual
behaviour  and  exercised  a  sometimes  decisive  influence  on  the  state.  It  also
participated in the state directly, in the form of voting. Yet opinion was in turn
subject to manipulation by the state, through both government influence on the
press and control of suffrage. Thus, from the aristocratic liberals'  prospective, the
state appeared in relation to the majority at one moment as a tool, at the next as a
master.10
13 Their criticism of the modern phenomena of massification and commercialisation, and
especially of their political consequences, however, did not make aristocratic liberals
anti-modern. Modern developments threatened their central values, but it was not the
Old  Regime  or  traditional  aristocracy  that  they  saw  as  guarantors  of these  values.
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Rather, they looked at the Revolution and the ensuing developments in order to find a
way to uphold their values, but they were themselves “partisans of modernity.”11 They
all  supported,  for  example,  the free press,  but also pointed to the dangers of  mass
opinion-making. They supported universal suffrage, but also pointed to the dangers
inherent in the lack of political education and the rise of demagoguery. Their main
hopes for avoiding these dangers lay in education, “both in the broad sense of political
participation and intellectual development and in the narrow sense of what could be
done  in  the  schools.”12 Their  major  writings,  like  Burckardt’s  cultural  histories  or
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America were meant to be part of an educational effort. Their
emphasis  on education,  Kahan argues,  was a  central  characteristic  of  their  modern
humanist  thinking.  Modern  humanism,  though  having  many  links  and  continuities
with Renaissance civic  humanism,  differed from it  in  terms of  the place it  gave to
virtue.  Virtue was no longer to be found in the public realm, but was rather to be
pursued in the private  realm by private  individuals.  Thus,  “the rhetorical  world of
modern humanism began to acquire a  new concern with the individual  apart  from
society, a concern utterly foreign to the classical and Renaissance perspectives.”13
14 Situating Eötvös on the palette of contemporary European thought has always been a
challenge  to  his  students.  Summaries  like  “individual  contentment  versus  common
good, market economy versus state-governed production, that is controlled economic
system,”14 which make Eötvös a proponent of classical liberalism understood in terms
of  individual  vs.  state,  free  market  economy  vs.  state  intervention,  can  easily  be
contrasted  to  passages  like  the  following:  “as  long  as  thousands  can  be  found
everywhere who have no other freedom but the freedom to die of starvation without
being compelled to work, it cannot be said that mankind must seek new paths because
it has fulfilled the tasks set by Christianity.”15 Passages like the latter ask for qualifying
his—and generally 19th century Hungarian—liberalism as being “in fact possessed of a
unique  and  extremely  effective  social  sensitivity.”16 His  “liberal  Catholicism” 17 or
“liberal  traditionalism,”18 and  his  acknowledgement  of  historic  rights  further
complicate  the  picture. The  monograph  attempting  the  most  comprehensive
reconstruction of Eötvös’s project argued that The Dominant Ideas cannot be discussed in
a single intellectual context, as the various problems this work raised were discussed
within the frameworks of various intellectual traditions,  a characteristic of cultures
relying on received ideas.19
15 Intellectual and personal connections between Mill, Tocqueville and Eötvös have been
well-documented: he sent both copies of the book, and wrote to the latter that, upon
reading his On Liberty, he was impressed by the similarity of their ideas, even though he
was unaware of Mill’s work in 1850.20 For our purposes, however, what is important is
not the genealogy of his ideas, but the existence of shared elements, arguments and
styles. 
16 One of the main threads of Eötvös’s argument was the discussion of the consequences
of popular sovereignty. Eötvös shared with most liberal thinkers of his age what has
been termed “the fear of democracy”: they contemplated the consequences of political
participation by  the  masses  as  a  threat  to  extant  culture  and even property,21 and
Eötvös  wrote  long  passages  on  the  threats  of  communism  ensuing  from  the—
misunderstood, he aimed to show—principle of equality. 
17 Contemplating the history of the French Revolution, József Eötvös saw the main agents
of revolutions as “demagogue ideologists, adventurous mercenaries and bloodthirsty
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masses.”22 In doing so he shared with Guizot, Tocqueville, Burckhardt or Mill a view of
the masses as brutish, driven by the pursuit of private gains and material interests.23
Thus, the traditional topoi if the vulgus met with the criticism of the modern processes
of massification. 
18 However, this line of argument did not lead to a denial of the political capacity of the
people. Although wary of popular revolutions, Eötvös, just like his aristocratic liberal
contemporaries, was not a supporter of the old regime. He wanted the institutions to
safeguard the individual, the people as well as the state against potential excesses, and
looked  for  the  institutions  capable  of  doing  so,  the  primary  such  safeguard  being
constitutionalism:
The fact that the masses are uncapable of ruling proves only that there cannot be
completely democratic States without a constitution which will  defend both the
State and individuals against the ineptitude and the passions of the ruling power. It
proves nothing else; those who see in the ineptitude of the masses a reason why
they should not enjoy political rights are obliged, if they want to be consistent, to
pronounce the same ban on other forms of government, monarchy for example;
they will then arrive at Plato’s utopia, in which the State is governed only by sages.
24
19 The people, whose conceptions the scholar of popular ideas was to understand, were
difficult to define. But when looking at who the supporters of the ideals of equality and
popular sovereignty were, Eötvös wrote, one was left only with the working classes
living in the large cities:
If we ask, who then wants the principle of equality to be realized to the extent to
which people are going into battle for it, the answer we shall get quite certainly be
“The whole people wants it.” If we go further and inquire who then is this “people,”
we shall be given answers which are bound to make us think of Beaumarchais’s
famous  definition  of  press  freedom.  By  this  token  the  people  includes  all  the
inhabitants of France except the nobility, the clergy, parliamentary deputies, civil
servants,  capitalists,  landowners,  tenant  farmers  who  employ  several  servants,
workers who by virtue of their higher technical training are better paid, scholars,
those who are too Catholic to want to subject the Church completely to the State
etc.  etc.,  in  a  word  except  all  who  have  other  views  about  equality  and  are
consequently  dubbed  “aristos”,  so  that  we  end  by  having  to  take  the  great
expression “the people” to mean only proletarians, and of them only those who live
in large cities and would lose nothing by an equal distribution of produce, because
they belong to the lowest class of workers.25
20 Throughout the book, visions of suburban masses threatening public order returned as
arguments against popular sovereignty understood as the rule of the majority.26 This
held especially true for the people of the capitals, spatially closer to the seats of power,
and  thus  capable  of  influencing  decisions  to  a  greater  degree.  Thus,  with  the
popularisation of politics, space became one of the important factors defining political
influence, by influencing the way the right of assembly or the right of resistance could
be exercised.27 The assembly of large numbers of people in cities also made them more
prone to the effects of demagogy,28 and led to the breakdown of traditional constraints
on  behaviour,  like  the  requirements  of  mercy  and  those  of  morality.  It  was  only
individuals who could act mercifully, never the people, hence the cruelty of clashes
between people and the dangers of nationalism:
The individual has a heart, the mass, never. A people is too large to be moved to
pity.  Why a  clash between one people and another is  always the most  cruel,  is
something on which they might reflect who try so hard to stir up the dormant
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hatred between nations; they might reflect before sowing the seed from which their
people will reap not greatness but general misery and degeneration.29
21 The criticism of the political consequences of the concentration of large masses in cities
was complemented by reflections on the cultural consequences of the process. Literary
history has also noted that the conflict between the modern city and possibilities for
individual  choices  and  action  was  a  central  topic  of  one  of  his  first  novels,  The
Carthusian, set in France in the 1830’s.30
22 Eötvös  primarily  thought  of  culture  in  the  culture  and  civilization  tradition,  with
“spiritual  culture”  encompassing  creations  of  art  and  religion,  much  in  the  vein
Burckhardt  did,31 but  he  also  held  a  wider  notion  of  civilization  that  encompassed
institutions, values and material culture, a conception he shared with Guizot.32 Culture
and civilization were also the sites of continuous material and spiritual improvement.
He regarded his whole oeuvre as preparation towards writing a comprehensive history
of Christian European civilization.33 Thus, he shared the general 19th century interest in
cultural  history,  and  regarded  his  writing,  along  with  his  aristocratic  liberal
contemporaries,  Tocqueville  or  Burckhardt,  as  a  means  of  historical  and  political
education.34
23 It  is  from this  position,  seeing  culture  and civilization as  continuously  progressing
towards mainly spiritual, but also material improvements, that his comments on the
consequences of massification and marketization were formulated. In terms of the arts,
this  meant that  artistic  creation became industrialised,  giving up the aesthetic  and
moral norms of the classics: “Art has abandoned the high position it once occupied. It is
usually not enthusiasm for what is beautiful and noble that fires the artists of our day.
Art has become industry; that is why its products can be taken as a gauge of the taste of
the times.”35
24 This process, however, also presented the scholar of political ideas with a new source-
base:  the  new  romantic  novels  satisfying  popular  demand  were  testimonies  to  the
values and ideals of the people. The romantic taste for the Middle Ages, for example,
was  to  be  seen  as  a  manifestation  of  a  longing  for  a  higher  degree  of  individual
freedom, in an age when the state encroached on more and more aspects of daily life.
Fashionable lifestyle choices like leaving civilisation and moving into the wilderness,
increasingly popular in both Europe and North America, were also seen as signs of a
longing  for  a  lost  freedom.36 Even  the  popularity  of  nationalism  was  proof  of  the
importance of local characteristics against a standardising age.37 Standardisation was
one  of  those  slogans  that  suburban masses  of  workers  chanted  with  regard  to  the
organisation of their work—but Eötvös doubted that if such standardisation was truly
attempted, for example by restoring the guilds, the results would satisfy them.38
25 The  strongest  criticism  of  the  forces  acting  towards  homogeneity,  uniformity  or
standardisation  came  when  discussing  popular  opinions  and  the  modern  press.  In
democracies, Eötvös argued, power was exercised by the people, the same who formed
public opinion. Therefore, the role of public opinion as a check on power was lost, as
such power was no longer bound by the moral norms traditionally enforced by public
opinion.39
26 Another  force  acting towards  the  uniformity  of  manifest  opinions  was  the  need to
amass large numbers in order for a demand, for example a petition, to be considered, a
result, Eötvös argued, of the principle of unlimited popular sovereignty. Under such
conditions, people joined causes they did not identify with, hoping for some indirect
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benefit  from  joining  a  large,  common  cause,  rather  than  upholding  the  unlimited
diversity of interests and demands which had no chance of being addressed by any
government.40
27 Modern governments took on to directing public opinion rather than attempting to
decipher it: “In our day, when the business of creating public opinion is run as a craft,
its peculiar techniques are far too well known for any further proof of what we have
said to be needed.”41 Although countries with a free press were much happier than
those  without  one,  the  press  was  used  by  those  with  access  to  it,  including  the
government,  to  direct  public  opinion.  The  process  of  industrialisation  had  reached
public opinion as well, the manufacturing of which having become a craft with specific
techniques.42 As the people became the locus of sovereignty, they also became the focus
of similar techniques of flattery as the crowned heads had before. Thus, the popular
public became similar to its feudal predecessor, both being the objects of cajolery:
People are always found in despotisms, where the feelings of the ruler decide State
policy, who will regularly appeal to those feelings; so in absolute democracies there
is no shortage of individuals who practice their own special craft by proclaiming
the feelings and views of the people. The messages trumpeted by these seneschals
and chamberlains of the people are just as shoddy as those which take wing in the
courts  of  princes.  If  anybody  should  want  to  question  the  complete  similarity
between the toadies of courts and those of marketplaces, we recommend that they
watch attentively those who appeal to the feelings and views of the people.43
28 In Eötvös’s critique of the consequences of massification there recurs the centuries-old
ambivalence  of  men of  letters  towards  the  opinion of  the  masses,  which  was  both
regarded as  volatile  and unreasoned,  and as  the basis  of  authority  and a  check on
power. The response of the Enlightenment to the problem that governments’ authority
rested on opinion, but at the same time the opinion of the masses was capricious and
prone  to  being  manipulated,  was  of  course  to  “enlighten”  the  public.  It  is  in  this
enlightenment project that the ambition of aristocratic liberals to educate the people
was  also  grounded.  The  idea  of  a  managed  public  opinion  recurs  of  course  in
Enlightenment  political  thought,  including  Rousseau  or  Voltaire,  as  a  means  for
“supplying the public with opinion,” a form of education of the masses.44 In the work of
the aristocratic liberals, however, educational aspirations were coupled with concerns
over  the  capacity  of  governments  and  majorities  to  manipulate  public  opinion,  a
possibility  enlarged  by  the  newly  professionalized  techniques  of  public  opinion
research:
To  sound  public  opinion  has  in  our  time  become  exclusively  the  task  of  the
government and those who aspire to power; the same people are the worst placed
to assess it correctly—first because they usually pay attention to it only in so far as
it  is  related to the government of  the State,  that is  to a matter on which most
people have no opinion45 
29 When  addressing  the  dangers  inherent  in  uniform  public  opinion  constructed  by
consciously  employing  manipulative  techniques,  Eötvös  also  spoke  a  language
employed  by  Tocqueville,  who  famously  discussed  public  opinion  as  a  means  of
exercising the tyranny of the majority, a view also echoed by Mill.46 
30 All these elements not only make Eötvös a Central European exponent of aristocratic
liberalism.  They  also  point  to  the  fact  that  aristocratic  liberalism  was  one  of  the
languages  in  which the  first  critical  analyses  of  the  political  consequences  of  mass
cultural phenomena was cast. As we shall argue below, the contribution of József Eötvös
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to this early critique was his insistence on the need to understand the meanings people
attached to popular ideas – an early argument for the need to study mass culture. 
 
Deciphering popular meanings: Eötvös’s proposal
31 Eötvös’s  work,  apart  from  criticism  and  stressing  the  importance  of  civilizational
improvement  and  education,  also  introduced  a  new  perspective.  In  the  opening
chapters  of  the  second  volume  of  The  Dominant  Ideas,  he  formulated  a  proposal  to
identify popular meaning-making practices, and ultimately to decipher the meaning
people attached to the ideas they rallied around. Liberty, equality and national identity,
as commonly understood by those who had tried to achieve them, proved incompatible.
Therefore, the argument went, either the ideas themselves were in some way wrong, or
they were put into practice in a manner foreign to their common understanding. The
task,  then,  Eötvös argued,  was to try and decipher the meaning people attached to
these ideas rather than theorise on their meanings, in order for these to be achievable
in the state.
32 How were these popular meanings meant to be deciphered, especially as the masses
tended to be inarticulate? In his history of the concept of public opinion, J.A.W. Gunn
argued  that  the  main  reason  the  issue  was  not  theorized  in  Britain  was  that  the
existence of an articulate public was taken for granted.47 Eötvös could make no such
assumption. On the contrary, he wrote, 
Masses need a rallying point. The shorter a word and the greater the variety of
meanings that can be attached to it, the more suitable it is for this purpose. Such
words  are  for  millions  usually  only  a  substitute  for  ideas  or  for  their  accurate
expression. Where nobody can express himself clearly, all agree on a word which
enables them to think what they want. Even the apparently general enthusiasm for
words  like  liberty,  equality  and  fraternity  does  not  entitle  us  to  draw  any
conclusions about the ideas, wishes and aspirations of the people.48
33 Although  there  were  professionals  employed  by  the  government  or  those  seeking
power, they only paid attention to public opinion inasmuch as it concerned matters of
government, matters which, Eötvös pointed out, most people did not have an opinion
about.49 Thus,  professional  public  opinion  research  was  compromised  by  the
government and party interests behind them, and moreover was often concerned with
directing rather than deciphering public opinion. A possible medium for articulating
public opinion was the right to petition, but, as we have seen above when discussing
the  consequences  of  massification  and  homogenisation,  petitions  joined  by  masses
could not be taken as expressions of shared meanings. The most important outlet, the
free press, was also compromised by these processes. Even though the importance of
the freedom of the press was beyond dispute, he argued, the press could hardly be
regarded  to  be  a  mirror  of  public  opinion.  This  would  presuppose  that  journalists
understood and expressed the opinions of the people and acted as carriers of the public
interest, which, sadly, he commented, was rarely the case.50
34 The only solution was then to look at the actions people undertook in the name of the
dominant ideas, at the goals they pursued when rallying around certain ideas. People
rallying around ideas  acted emotionally,  driven by feelings  rather  than by rational
thinking. The importance of emotions, Eötvös argued, was in fact a characteristic of the
times,  and  needed  to  be  addressed  if  one  was  to  understand  what  people  meant.
Emotions were also important in terms of organising the state, as mechanistic power
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that  did  not  take  into  account  emotions  was  only  obeyed  because  perceived  as
unavoidable.51 For example, understanding popular antipathy towards the police could
lead to a better understanding of the meaning of liberty and equality for the people.
Equality,  understood as  homogenisation and standardisation,  manifested itself  most
strongly in the modern state in the work of  the police.  Yet  in all  states,  antipathy
towards the police ran high. This emotion, Eötvös argued, allows us to understand that
it was in fact the principle of liberty, and not that of equality, that people held most
important.52
35 Apart from some scattered remarks like the interpretation of public antipathy towards
the police,  however,  the book does not offer a systematic demonstration of  how to
reconstruct popular meanings. Thus, its importance remains at a theoretical level, as
an  argument  for  understanding  popular  meaning-making  practices  in  order  to
formulate normative proposals for public life.
36 Historians of philosophy have interpreted Eötvös’s proposal as an anti-philosophical
stance that could be explained by socio-historical causes. J.C. Nyíri wrote in a study
entitled “From Eötvös to Musil. Philosophy and its negation in Austria and Hungary”53
that  19th century  Hungarian intellectuals  had in  general  such an anti-philosophical
stance. This interpretation set up an opposition between “philosophy and its negation,”
or  “pre-conceived  ideas”  and  “action,”  situating  Eötvös,  and  more  generally  the
politically-minded 19th century Hungarian thinkers, in the latter group, defined by “the
conservative view according to which pre-conceived ideas cannot serve as a basis for
sound political action.”54
37 A  different  approach  in  interpreting  Eötvös  was  suggested,  though  not  elaborated
upon, by Gábor Gángó, who saw the importance of Eötvös in attempting not only to
search for solutions to the problems of national conflicts, but also in a methodological
novelty.  This  novelty  consisted, according  to  Gángó,  in  undertaking  a  conceptual
analysis starting not from definitions, but from the statements made about the causes
and reasons of such movements, resembling the methodology of the modern history of
ideas.55 This  interpretation focused on the role of  ideas and their  understanding in
Eötvös’s  work,  identified as  having central  importance in  our own overview of  The
Dominant Ideas. Another key term in Eötvös’s methodological proposal was experience.
He  introduced  the  importance  of  experience  when  pleading  for  the  application  of
Bacon’s inductive method, instead of the application of preconceived ideas. Gathering
experience also meant incursions into the history of ideas, into the way they have been
understood and the consequences with which they have been applied in history. 
38 Among the various intellectual companions Eötvös can be and has been associated with,
his congeniality with Tocqueville takes on a new dimension if we focus on the role they
both ascribed to ideas in society. Apart from the similarities between the two authors
in the analysis  of  modern public  opinion formation,  scepticism towards speculative
philosophy  or  practical  solutions  like  the  importance  of  participation  in  local
governments,56 Eötvös also shared with Tocqueville his understanding of the role of
ideas  in  society.  Tocqueville  opposed  political  sociology  to  speculative  philosophy,
favouring the  former,  because  of  his  conception of  politically  effective  truth.57 The
effective truth was what people were willing to believe: “Tocqueville’s political science
could, indeed, be described primarily as the study of the origins and effects of such
popular  opinions  or  even less  articulate  attitudes  and sentiments.”58 Similarities  in
their understanding of  the working of  public  opinion,  for example,  thus stem from
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their shifting the focus of analysis, from seeking universally-valid general ideas to what




39 József  Eötvös,  along  with  his  aristocratic  liberal  contemporaries,  addressed  the
phenomena of the popularisation of politics and the rise of mass movements, tastes or
opinions from the point of view of their impact on their cherished values, primarily
liberty. They regarded these phenomena with disquiet, as threatening. Eötvös’s views
on the increased role of urban masses, his views on public opinion and the press, his
criticism  of  mediocrity  in  various  domains  of  life,  all  connect  him  to  the  great
aristocratic liberals of  his  times.  In their work,  the analysis  of  the consequences of
massification and commodification of culture, of the standardization of popular ideas
and  even  emotions,  of the  threats  of  the  tyranny  of  majority  opinion  and  the
possibilities of manipulation inherent in the newly professionalized mass media and
public opinion research, were coupled with an educational project, as part of which
their major works were written. The main thrust of their criticism was aimed at the
processes of standardisation and uniformity, threatening individual liberty.
40 This aristocratic liberal critique of the rise of mass politics and mass culture can thus
be regarded as one the first attempts at articulating the relationship between popular
culture  and  power,  which  later  became  central  to  the  preoccupations  of  cultural
studies. Eötvös’s interest was not an interest in “popular culture” in any of the current
connotations  of  the  expression.  Yet  his  critique,  along with  that  of  his  intellectual
companions, was one of the routes by which popular meaning-making practices came
to  the  forefront  of  intellectual  attention,  and  aristocratic  liberalism  as  a  political
language can be regarded as one of the first languages in which the critique of the
emergent, urban mass culture was cast. 
41 Eötvös’s main contribution to this literature is his argument for the need to understand
what the masses meant when rallying around the dominant ideas of their times. In
spite  of  his  concern  for  their  political  consequences,  Eötvös  also  saw  the  rising
importance of  popular  meaning-making practices  as  unavoidable,  and formulated a
theoretical argument for trying to decipher them. Even though the actual examples of
such interpretations, like his analysis of popular attitudes towards the police, are few,
his proposal is an important addition to aristocratic liberal critique. In formulating his
argument, Eötvös pointed to several components of mass meaning-making practices
that needed to be understood if one was to design public institutions that held popular
support: the importance of popular emotions, of the professionalised and marketized
techniques of popularising both arts and political ideas. Thus, his criticism of popular
ideas voiced his strong concern about the political consequences of populism and the
process of massification, but at the same time argued for a better understanding of
these  ideas.  His  proposal  for  deciphering  popular  meanings  focused on the  actions
undertaken in the name of ideas, and the emotions attached to them, and primarily
meant to address the political consequences of popular ideas. Understanding these was
meant not only as a contribution to cultural history, but also to a better understanding
and even ordering of public life. 
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Writing after the failure of the 1848 Hungarian revolution, József Eötvös, himself a prominent
politician and novelist, grappled with the sources of the failure and conditions of success of social
and political reforms. In his monumental work, The Dominant Ideas of the Nineteenth Century and
their Impact on the State, he proposed that in order to understand the behaviour of the masses and
design social and political reforms that will have popular support, one needed to understand the
meanings  people  assigned  to  popular  ideas—as  opposed  to  meanings  assigned  to  them  by
theorists. Popularity, in this approach, had three components: ideas around which people rallied,
emotions that connected them to these ideas, and actions people undertook in their name. The
way towards understanding these components was to understand the culture of the people in its
various manifestations, from popular religiosity to literary and material culture. By re-reading
Eötvös’s  work  focusing  on  his  conception  of  popular  ideas,  this  paper  investigates  how  the
longstanding tension between popularity and the distrust in populism was articulated in a classic
of nineteenth century central European political thought.
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